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The models presented here are for the allocation of mis-
siles to defended targets with a fixed force of imperfect
defense missiles. The attackers will be directed first at
the defense sites then at the targets themselves. The im-
perfect defenders are used against the attackers on a one-
for-one basis as long as defenders remain. If any attacker
penetrates the defense site, all the defenders at that de-
fense site are destroyed. The problems addressed are the
offensive problems of determining how many attackers to send
to each defense site and to the target complex. The neces-
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze a ballistic
missile attack against defended targets with the purpose of
determining effective targeting tactics for the offense.
Basically we consider a target complex containing a
known number of targets. The complex is defended by a known
number of defensive missiles divided into two sites, each
having an automatic radar-controlled defensive system.
The attacking missiles can be directed at the defensive
missile sites or at the targets themselves. If an attacking
missile is aimed at the defense site and it penetrates the
defensive system, it destroys that entire guarding system.
The attack is assumed to be sequential. The offense first
commits some number of its attackers to the defensive sites,
then it attacks the targets. The defense is assumed to be
one-on-one. Both the offensive and defensive missiles are
imperfect, each working with some known probability.
The offensive problem is to determine how its fixed
force of attackers should be allocated between the two de-
fense sites and the targets in the main complex. We assume
that the offense receives no information about the success
or failure of its weapons in the course of the attack. The
measure of effectiveness used is to maximize the expected
number of targets destroyed.
9

The report describes the computations involved in the
allocation models and solves some sample problems for illus-






This thesis considers the ballistic missile attack of a
complex of targets surrounded by defense missiles. In order
to gain the highest damage to the targets, it is desired to
allocate the attackers optimally between the defense sites
and the targets themselves. In the following cases that
will be developed, we assume ground to air defender missiles
in the models. The attackers might be launched from a sub-
marine underwater, or they might come from the surface of
the ocean or from any station on the ground. We assume we
know the probability that a missile will hit a distant tar-
get. We also assume the attacker has good intelligence in-
formation and knows the number of defenders, their placement
and the probability of their successfully destroying an at-
tacking missile. Thus we know the hit probability of an
attacker and also the installation of the defense sites of
the enemy country. The mission is to destroy the targets
which are defended by these anti-missile systems. The de-
fense sites themselves are of no value as targets to the
attacker except that destroying them permits the offense to
reach the desired targets.
The first model presented here is for the attack of a
target complex with two defense sites around it using a
fixed force of imperfect missiles. The attackers will be
directed first at the two defense sites then at the targets
11

themselves. The imperfect defenders are used against the
attackers on a one-for-one basis as long as defenders remain.
If any attacker penetrates a defense site, all the defenders
at that site are destroyed. The problem addressed is the
offensive problem of determining how many attackers to send
to each defense site and to the target complex.
We discuss next some generalizations to n defense sites,
two types of defensive missiles and two defense sites and in
another model two types of offensive missiles and two defense
sites.
B. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
This section discusses the choice of the measure of ef-
fectiveness used in the allocation model. The ballistic
missile attack is analyzed from the offensive point of view.
The objective of the analysis is to determine tactics which
will permit the offense to use his forces more effectively.
The term "more effective use of resources" must be trans-
lated into terms which can be used unambiguously to guide
the offense in its weapon deployment.
Aside from the deterrent effect, the purpose of the of-
fensive system is to destroy targets. It would be desirable
in an actual attack to destroy, if possible, the most valu-
able set of targets, but then we have the problem of deter-
mining or assigning target values. No general agreement can
be reached regarding the values to be assigned; and even if
agreement could be reached, any values assigned could not
reflect interaction between targets. For example, the value
12

of an industrial target depends very much on the continued
existence of a power plant to run it.
It is assumed that if some targets have a value which is
obviously large compared to most of the others, these targets
will be given special consideration in targeting. The ma-
jority of the targets, however, are assumed to be of roughly
comparable value and the criterion used in this report is to
maximize the expected number of targets destroyed. It is
assumed here that the targets do not vary in value with time.
For planning purposes on a larger scale it is possible
that a more versatile measure of effectiveness would be de-
sired, but for examination of alternative tactics the criter-
ion of maximizing the expected number of targets destroyed
serves as a useful means of comparing alternatives.
C. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Suppose we let
t = the number of the targets in the complex,
a. = the number of offensive missiles assigned to the
defensive site i,
t. = the number of defensive missiles in each defense
site i,
E(t,a.) = the expected number of targets destroyed.









III. BASIC PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. DESCRIPTION
The basic problem addressed in this report is the prob-
lem of allocating a fixed force of imperfect offensive mis-
siles to a fixed set of targets. All of the targets are in
the complex. The number of targets is known to the offense.
There are two defense sites for the complex. Each defense
site is defending the targets in the complex using a known
number of imperfect defensive missiles each of which can be
used against any missile approaching any target in the com-
plex.
It is assumed that the number of defensive missiles in
each defense site is the same. The attack has two basic
phases, first the attack on the defense sites, then the at-
tack on the actual targets. The attacks on the defense sites
can be assumed to proceed simultaneously if the offense has
two launcher systems available. The attacking missiles can
be directed to either the targets themselves or to the de-
fensive missile launching complex, probably the control ra-
dars. It is also assumed that if an offensive missile which
is aimed at one defensive complex penetrates that defense
and hits its target, the entire force of defensive missiles
in that complex is rendered useless. If an offensive mis-




The attack can be thought of as sequential, the offensive
first directing some number of attackers to both defense
sites and then the remainder to the targets themselves. We
assume that the offense has no damage assessment capability;
that is, he cannot tell which missiles, if any, have success-
fully penetrated to their targets. We also assume in the
report that the defense does not have the capability of at-
tack evaluation; that is, he cannot determine in flight the
impact point of an incoming missile accurately enough that
he dares to let it pass undefended with the knowledge that
it will impact harmlessly. Even if the defense can determine
the impact point he is assumed here to be unable to correlate
that information in real time with the continued existence
or previous death of targets near the impact point. Thus we
assume that as long as the defense has missiles available he
will not let offensive missiles proceed undefended. We as-
sume that the defense is one-on-one.
The model is an offense-last-move model and assumes that
the offense knows both the number of targets and the number
of defensive missiles in each complex. Thus the offense
will never allocate more attackers to the defensive systems
than the number of defensive missiles minus one because the
supply of defensive missiles serving as targets will be ex-
hausted at that point.
Since the offensive has no damage assessment capability,
the best process for him to follow is to spread as evenly
15

as possible over the targets those re-entry vehicles which
are allocated to targets.
The basic problem then is to determine the optimal allo-
cation of the fixed forces of offenders to the defensive sys-
tems and the target complexes to maximize the expected number
of targets destroyed. See Figure 1. We assume that t is




For two defense sites protecting the targets in the com-
plex, we use the following notation in the model.
Let
t = the number of targets in the complex,
tj = the number of defenders in defense site number one,
t 2 = the number of defenders in defense site number two,
A = the total number of attackers,
a = the number of attackers assigned to targets in the
main complex,
a.\ = the number of attackers assigned to defense site
number one,
a 2 = the number of attackers assigned to defense site
number two,
p = probability that an attacking missile kills its
a
target when no defender is used,
p, = probability that a defensive missile which is as-











p, = p (1-p, ), the probability that an attacking missile
l£ £t CI
kills its target when a defender is used.
Suppose the number of defenders in sites one and two are
equal. Then we always assign aj equal to a 2 .
Let
P. = probability that exactly i defenders remain avail-
able for use after the first a
:
+a 2 = 2aj attackers




• {i-a-p^i" 1 } if i = tj-ax
P. = <1
(l-pk )
2tl i if i= 2(t!-a!)
^ otherwise.
Number the attackers beginning with the first one which
is assigned to a target and let
P = probability that attacker r kills a target.
We have
P = p • (probability that target is not defended)
X* <x
+ Pi. * (probability that target is defended).
Let
R = probability that the r target is defended,
= probability that r or more defenders remain avail-










P = p • (1-R ) + p. • R
r a r' *k r
= p -p«R +p«R
*a *a r *k r
= pa " (pa"pk )Rr
pa papd r
= pa " papd
2(ti-ai)
i=r
The expected total number of targets killed in the com-



























P (a) - ^-V 2*'
Then we have
E(t,ai) = (A-2a x )pa - PaPd(t i-aj ) [P* + 2P* a) ]
Table I helps to illustrate the derivation of this form
of E(t,ai ).
Analytical efforts to maximize E(t,ai) over ai have not
been successful, but for fixed values of p , p , , A and ti
it is easy to compute E(t,ai) for all ai £ ti. The results
can be plotted and the best values of a determined. This
has been done for a few sample cases and the results are
shown in Figures 2 and 3.
20

Suppose A = 30
ti = t 2 = 10
in the case ai = a 2 = 6
\ i (t i-ai ) 2(tj- aj )
r \ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 P 1 P 2
2 P 1 P 2
3 P 1 P 2








18 a 1 ,
•
Table I



























































































A. SEVERAL DEFENSE SITES
We consider now a more general case of this model. Sup-
pose the targets in the main complex are very important.
The defense might spread out a large number of defensive mis-
siles into several groups around the complex with a separate
control system for each site. The basic one-on-one defense
is still assumed. The offense must decide the optimal num-
ber of attackers to assign to each of the defense sites.
It is assumed that the number of defensive missiles in
each defense site is the same. In general the attacker mis-
siles could come from any base or carrier and might be dif-
ferent kinds of missiles launched from different ranges to
the targets. Thus they could have different probabilities
of hitting the targets. But in the case here we will assume
that all of the offensive missiles have the same hit proba-
bility.
We will consider the special cases of different types of
missile, tactics, and different numbers of defensive missiles
in each defense site later.
The number of targets destroyed is still employed as the
measure of effectiveness. We continue the assumption that
all defensive missiles have the same probability of defense
against an attacking missile. The defensive systems are il-











The allocation model for n guarding systems
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It is assumed that the number of targets is greater than
the number of attackers and that the offense has no damage
assessment capability as before.
Now, we will look more closely at some special cases.
Suppose we have n defense sites and each of them independent
of the others. We will develop the ideas from the one de-
fense site, then two, and so on until we obtain the model
for n defense sites.
The complication resulting from increasing the number of
defense sites comes primarily from the difficulty in express-
ing the probability that any offensive missile will receive
a defender. The expected number of targets destroyed de-
pends of course on the number of defenders which remain
available after the initial attack on the defense sites is
completed.
Consider the following cases:
i) For the case of one defense site we have
E(t,ai) = (A- ai )pa - p^Cti-a^d-p^
3- 1
. [Ref. 1]
ii) For two defense sites we have




(t 1 -a 1 )[Pj a) + 2P* a) ]
or









iii) The situation is somewhat more complicated with
three defense sites. What follows is essentially a
listing of the possible outcomes of the initial at-
tack on the defense sites.
1) For the case in which two systems have been
destroyed (one survives) we have
Pj







2) If one site has been destroyed (two survive)
we have
P*
a) = 3[l-(l-pk )
a M- (l-pk )
2a\ i=2(t 1 -a 1 ).
3) If none has been destroyed (three survive) we
have
P^
a) = (l-pk )





ti = t 2 = ts = 10.
Now, consider the case where ai=8,
this case.
Table II illustrates
N (ti-ai ) 2(ti-ai ) 3(ti--aO
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 P 1 P 2 p3
2 P 1 P 2 p3
3 P 2 P 3






16 . . • . . • • •
Table II




E(t, ai ) = (A-3av)p
a
-p
aPd(t 1 -.a 1 )[Pj a)+2P^ a)+3P (
3
a) ] .
Furthermore, we see that
P (a) " 3U-d-Pk )
aM 2 d-Pk )
ai







^-Pk^ 1 ] 3 •
Now, let
f = [l-(l-pk )
ai
]
t = [(l-Pk )
aM and f + t = 1,
then
P\ . = 3f 2 t(a)





which can be written in the "Binomial" form as
P (a)
= (l) "'
P (a) " <"> *' •











= (?) fn_3 * t3
(a) l i ; x x
pn n. n
The expected number of targets killed in the case of n
defense sites can easily be constructed.
We get
E(t,a
x ) = (A-na 1 )pa-paPd (t 1 -a 1 )[P
1 +2P 2 +. . .+iP 1 +. . ,+nPn ]
,
where P, . is written as P ,i = l,...,n.(a)
Consider








,n XJ,n-i .n NJ? n-2 , 2 .^n.-n-i .i ,nu n(i)f 't + 2( 2 )f *t z + ...+ i( i )f t +...+ n( n )t ,
where the probability that j defense sites survive is
P = ( .)f _J «t . We can see that this is the expected number





E(t,ai) = (A-nai )pa-paPd (ti-ai) , 3=1,2, . . . ,n,
or
E(t,ai) = (A-nai )pa-paPd (ti-ax )E( j).
A few samples of three defensive systems are presented
in Figure 5. We assume that the attackers are all identical
and all of the defenders in any guarding complex are the
same. The quantities A, ai , a2 , a3 , ti, t2
,
p and p, are
a u.
shown on the figure.
If we assume ai=a2=a3=. . . =a , it is not hard to determine
n
the optimal number of attackers to each defense site. We
will see in the next section the effect of changing p , ai
Et
and a 2 , p, for each defense site.
B. TWO TYPES OF DEFENSIVE MISSILES AND TWO DEFENSE SITES
Consider the case that the defense sites have two differ-
ent kinds of weapons, and their abilities to destroy the
attackers are different.
Suppose the first defense site uses the defenders of
Type 1, and each has the probability p of intercepting one
attacker. The second site uses the defenders of Type 2, and













ai = a 2 = a 3
6 ai
FIGURE 5
Optimal solutions for three defense sites






Two types of defensive missiles from two defense sites
Let
Let
ai = number of attackers assigned to first defense site,
a2 = number of attackers assigned to second defense site,
a = number of attackers assigned to the targets in the
complex,
A = total number of attackers available, ai+a2+a.
P. = probability that i defenders remain in both defense
sites together,
P 1 1= probability that only the first defense site still
survives after the first attack, (a]+a 2 attackers).
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p 1 2 = probability that only the second defense site still
survives after the first attack.
P2 = probability that both defense sites still survive.
Suppose the numbers ai , a 2 are not necessarily the same,
and the numbers tj
, t 2 are not necessarily the same.
























p, = p (1-p )
^ky *a v *y'




.thR = probability that the r attacker will be defended,
Then
(ti-ai)+(.t 2-a 2 )
i=r
The expected total number of targets killed in the com-
plex will be written as E(t,ai,a 2 ).
We have that
A-(a!+a 2 )







(ti-ai )+(t 2 -a 2 )
i=r
1-
(ti-ai )+(t 2 -a 2 )
i=r
[A-(ai+a 2 )]pa-paPx (t 1 -a 1 )(P
11
+P 2 )
-p p (t 2 -a 2 )(P w +P^).
a y
Some examples to illustrate the model are presented in Fig-
ures 7 and 8.
C. TWO TYPES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES AND TWO DEFENSE SITES
1. Tactic 1
We will consider another case. Suppose we have two
types of attackers. The one which is assigned to the first
defense site has the probability p, of successfully attack-
ing the target and the other has probability p . Other
















Defense site I has prob. detect p
Defense site II has prob. detect p
FIGURE 7





E(t ,ai ,a.2 )
6-
5--








t, = to = 6




Defense Site 1 has prob. detect p









Two types of attackers assigned one type to one defense site
Define aj , a 2 , a and A as in part B. The numbers ai and a 2
are not necessarily equal, nor are ti and t 2 .
Let
Aj = total number of Type 1 attackers,
and
A 2 = total number of Type 2 attackers.
Then A = Aj+A 2 , total number of attackers, and P., P 11 , P 12 ,
P 2 are the same as case B.
In this case the kill probability p, depends on the
weapon type since there are two types of attackers. The
quantity p, is the probability that an attacker kills its




p., = p, = p,(l-p. ), if the first type of attackers is
used, and
p. = p, = p (1-p, ), if the second type of attackers
is used.
The probability that exactly i defenders survive the initial








i=t 1 -a 1 ,
'kc 'kb-









P 2 = d-P^) ai (l-Pv«), a 2kb 'kc
V.
, i=(ti-a! )+(t 2 -a 2 ),
,
otherwise.
The expected number of targets destroyed is
(Ai-a! )+(A 2 -a 2 )
E(t,ai ,a 2 ) = [p, «R + p (1-R )]k r ^a r
r=l





E(t,ai,a 2 ) = (A 1 -a 1 )pb + (A 2 -a 2 )p c - PbPd (t i-a x ) (P
1 l +P 2 )
-P
c
Pd (t 2 -a 2 )(P
W +P <)
A few examples are presented in the graph in Figures 10, 11
and 12. Figure 10, illustrates different numbers of mis-
siles in the defense sites 1 and 2 and the different values







H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1- -I 1 1-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 aj
A = 42, t
FIGURE 10
Two types of attacking missiles









' E(t, a 2 )
p. = . 9 p = . 9
10




p, = . 8 p = . 6









Two types of attackers with kill probabilities p , p resp.
Ai = A 2 = 10
ti = t 2 - 5
pd
= .9
a! = 2 (optimal)









A 2 = 10
ti = 5
t 2 = 5














prob. kill target when no defender is used of Type 1
prob. kill target when no defender is used of Type 2
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attackers. Figures 11 and 12 show that the high p, or p
values will give the optimal allocations near the middle of
a2(ai) axis, but for low p. or p the figures show that the
optimal allocation will move the number of attackers assigned
to the defense sites to a very low number.
2. Tactic 2
As in case 1 suppose we have two types of offensive
missiles and the defense still has two defense sites but only
one type of defender. Suppose we change our tactics and in-
stead of assigning one type to each defense site we let one
type attack both defense sites and the other attack the tar-
gets in the main complex. If optimal we also attack targets
with some missiles of the first type.
We will call the two types of attackers Type 1 and
Type 2. Type 1 and Type 2 have probabilities of hitting a
distant target p and p, respectively when no defender is
used. See Figure 13.
Let
p, 1 = p (1-p.) be the probability that a Type 1 attacker
kills its target when a defender is used,
and let
p._ = p (1-p, ) be the probability that a Type 2 attacker
kills its target when a defender is used.
It is assumed that Type 2 (Ph ) is always assigned to






Two types of attackers, one type primarily for defense sites

















i=t 2 -a 2 ,
P2
- (l-Pu^d-Pki)* 1 , i=(t 1 -a 1 )+(t 2 -a 2 ),
V otherwise,
where ti, t 2 are the numbers of defenders in defense sites
1 and 2 respectively.
Let P = probability that attacker r kills a target
We have




Pb , r=A!-(ai+a 2 )+l, . . .
,
Aj-Caj+az )+A 2 ,
where the attackers are numbered beginning with the first
Type 1 missile which is assigned to a target in the complex.
The Type 2 missiles are all assigned to the targets in the
complex and are numbered consecutively following the Type 1
missiles.
As before we can write
Ai-(ai+a 2 ) A 1 -(a 1 +a 2 )+A 2
E(t ,ai ,a 2 ) =
r=l
[Pkl'VPa (1 - Rr )1 +
r=Ai-(ai+a 2 )+l
[p, . *R +p (l-R )] + A 2 p,L
^kl r *a r /J *d
1 lj.T>2
'b
= A 2p.+[A 1 -(a 1 +a 2 )]pQ-P QPH (ti-a 1 )(P
1 +P z )
-PaPd
(t 2 -a 2 )(P 12 +P 2 )
= A 2 p, +[A 1 -(a 1 +a 2 )]p o -p o p,[(t 1 +t 2 )-(a 1 +a 2 )]
•
a *Vd'





By fixing the quantities Aj , A 2 , p , p, , ti and t 2 ,
we can determine the optimal numbers of ai and a 2 to assign
to the defense sites. A few examples are shown by Figures
















A 2 = 18
16- ti = t 2 = 9












6 8 9 a 2
Two types of attackers: Type p, assigned exclusively to
targets in the complex; Type p assigned primarily to
a,
guarding systems, then to targets.
FIGURE 14
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Figures 14 and 15 show the results of allocating Type 1
and Type 2 attackers with the probabilities p and p re-
spectively in various ways to the defense sites and targets.
We have computed the maximum number of targets destroyed
with fixed numbers of A, A
x ,
A 2 , p, and ai . If Type 1 (p )
Cl 3-
is assigned to the defense sites and has a lower probability
of hit than Type 2 (Ph ) which is assigned to the targets in
the complex we obtain a higher expected number of targets
destroyed than in the reverse case.
In Case Cl each type of attacker is aimed first at one
defense site then at the targets in the complex. Figure 15
shows the expected number of targets destroyed using the
same input data as given in Case C2. Case Cl does not give
the highest expected number destroyed. The lower p assigned
to the defense sites and higher p assigned to the targets
in the main complex gives the best result.
The allocation of identical attackers in Cases A and B
of section IV does not seem as interesting as in the Case Cl
and C2 where there are different types of attackers. Case
A where the number of defense sites is generalized can be
used to compute the optimal number of attackers. Likewise
the different types of defensive missiles in Case B can be
dealt with in the model to obtain the optimal allocation.
Models of different kinds of situations have been devel-
oped. The model that gives all different numbers Aj , Ai,...,
49

A , ai , a 2 , . . . , a , p , p, , . . . , p , , p or p is easy to con-m n' *a b d x *y J
struct and the optimal allocations aj, a 2 , . . . , a can be ob-
tained from it. In these cases the necessary calculations
can easily be done using the computer.
It can be seen from the results that if p (probability
El
of an attacker hitting the target when no defender is used)
is very low such as p = .2, .3, we might not need any at-
tackers aimed at the defense sites. Ignoring these defense
sites and allocating all of the attackers to the main tar-
gets in the complex will give the highest expected number of
targets destroyed. In the case that p and p, (probability
cl Q
of a defensive missile intercepting an incoming attacker)
are reasonably high, such as p and p, = .7, .8, .9, we should
assign some number of attackers to the defense sites first
and the rest of them to the targets to obtain the best re-
sult .
Other generalizations can be considered, such as chang-
ing the structure of the defensive complex to consist of
several launcher group controls. We can consider the case
that the defenders are not rendered useless until two at-
tackers penetrate. This would be relevant for the case
where each launcher group has two control radars, either of
which can control the interceptors.
Generalizations could also be made by changing the as-
sumption about the knowledge available to the offense and
defense. If the defense has attack evaluation capability,
his performance will be improved; or if the offense has
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damage assessment capability he can increase the expected
number of targets destroyed.
A very interesting and apparently difficult extension is
to assume that some of the targets have a value which dimin-
ishes with time. If some of the targets are offensive mis-
sile launchers there is no benefit in attacking the launcher
after the missile is gone. Another case which is important
is the difference in value of targets. Some targets might
be assembly plants for the enemy force, some could be supply
depots. Problems with different target values cannot be
adequately analyzed in terms of number of targets destroyed.
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